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Abstract | Democracy is usually contrasted with the concept of dictatorship, and is defined as a 
type of government in which power flows from the citizens to the leaders of government, who are 
selected through free elections. This article argues, that if the concept of democracy is generalized to 
be universally applicable, then the concept of hypothetical gods’ right to rule results in dictatorship. 
Whereas the concepts of dictator and tyrant originally had a more positive meaning, those meanings 
have changed. However, the concept of the gods in the philosophical debate has avoided a similar 
redefinition in light of democracy, despite the fact, that it involves the same negation of modern fun-
damental rights. The basic democratic idea posits that all of its members have a full and equal status. 
If this status is generalized to be universally applicable, then it follows that humankind likewise are 
not second and first class among hypothetical gods. The existence or nonexistence of the gods is here 
defined as the secondary question, whereas the principal acceptance of hypothetical gods’ right to rule 
in a democratic context with respect to concepts of freedom is defined as the primary question. The 
position of heroical apatheism is argued as an alternative to positions such as theism, atheism, and ag-
nosticism. These positions only concern themselves with the ontological or epistemological question 
of whether the gods exist, whereas heroical apatheism concerns itself with the primary component 
missing so far, namely democratic rights and dignity. This is a discussion that I consider as having 
been overlooked in modern philosophical discussions.
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Introduction
Human beings have a great need for explanations. That is one of the reasons that religion is so 
universal: religion attempts to provide explanations. 
Human beings enter their individual consciences in a 
mystical universe that they yearn to understand. This 
primal need to explain the universe and our place in it 
has created a vast number of religions worldwide. One 
source notes that globally, there are approximately 
10,000 different religions today (Barrett et al. 2001). 
Such numbers are always open to debate of course, 
but they are the only ones available. If we also include 
all of the religions that no longer have followers, the 
number will naturally increase.
There is no credible estimate of how many gods the 
human imagination has produced. Ever since the be-
ginning of recorded history, which is often placed at 
the beginning of the Sumerians’ written language ap-
proximately 6,000 years ago (Woods 2010), thousands 
of deities have been recorded. Godschecker’s Encyclope-
dia currently contains more than 4,000 gods (Saun-
ders et al. 2015). The real number is obviously much 
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higher because that encyclopedia includes only the 
gods we know since the beginning of recorded history 
and that its writers have had the time to catalogue. If 
we were to add the number of gods in which human-
kind has believed throughout its existence as Homo 
sapiens, tens of thousands of gods would be included. 
The literature contains an almost consequential con-
sensus about speaking of deities in the singular. I will 
disregard this custom because I consider it a mistake. 
First, there is a basic understanding in the field of 
comparative religion that there are thousands of reli-
gions and, by extension, thousands of gods (Rudolph 
2000). Thus, it is standard scientific practice here to 
speak of gods in the plural. 
Second, the modern claim that different religions’ gods 
are merely different interpretations of the same deity 
is openly a non sequitur. An application of elementary 
conceptual analysis to various religions shows that it 
is not possible to derive a single generic deity in light 
of the various religions’ own doctrines. To provide one 
simple example, we note the postulate, that the god of 
Christianity and the god of Islam are merely different 
interpretations of the same god. According to Chris-
tianity, Yahweh allowed himself to be incarnated as a 
human being or, alternatively, had a son with a human 
being (Burkett 2011). According to Islam, Allah nev-
er allowed himself to be incarnated as a human being 
or, alternatively, had a son with a human being (Sirry 
2014). A simple analysis with premises and conclu-
sion leads to, that either these religions speak of two 
different gods or one of those gods is false. 
Third, it could be claimed, that one way to avoid the 
previous conclusions is by attempting to separate 
discussions of the gods from the various religions, 
thus avoiding disagreement between how the differ-
ent religious doctrines define their deities. Here, the 
justification for referring to the gods in the singular 
is founded especially on the same basic assumptions 
used in the ontological proofs of gods, such as perfect 
being, greatest conceivable being, transcendent being, 
infinite being, etc. As a starting point, however, none 
of these basic assumptions have demonstrated any 
convincing strength (Oppy 2006). Furthermore, these 
assumptions are alien to many believers who are at-
tached to specific god doctrines. Finally, the belief in 
pantheons makes this claim an automatic non sequitur. 
I will not proceed further with the notion of a sin-
gle god in this article, but simply note, that because 
no single deity or religion can convincingly be said 
to possess a higher probability than any other, it fol-
lows that the most adequate way to speak from the 
perspective of comparative religion and philosophy of 
religion is to use the plural term gods. Therefore, I will 
henceforth strictly use the terms gods or deities. 
Philosophical terms addressing the various views of 
the gods fall within the following isms. The first is 
theism, defined as the belief that a deity exists. It is 
usually argued that polytheism (i.e., the belief in the 
existence of multiple deities) is a special case of clas-
sical theism, that is, where one defines theism spe-
cifically as the belief in at least one deity (Thompson 
2014). However, considering that polytheism histori-
cally has been the dominant point of view, from com-
parative religions perspective it is more reasonable to 
define theism as a special case of polytheism. 
The direct response to theism is atheism, the belief 
that there are no deities. This ism originates from the 
Greek atheos, where “a” means without or not and 
“theos” means a god (Martin 1990). From the ety-
mological meaning of the term, an atheist is, strictly 
speaking a person without a belief in a deity, but not 
necessarily a person who believes that deities do not 
exist. This is called negative atheism. The more well-
known version of atheism is different and states that 
an atheist not only simply does not believe in deities’ 
existence but also actively believes in their nonexist-
ence. This is called positive atheism (Martin 1990). 
Finally, there is agnosticism, a term advocated by T.H. 
Huxley in 1869, although previous thinkers also ad-
vanced agnostic views. Agnosticism can be defined as: 
“The vigorous application of a single principle. Posi-
tively the principle may be expressed as, in matters of 
the intellect, follow your reason as far as it can carry 
you without other considerations. And negatively, in 
matters of the intellect, do not pretend the conclu-
sions are certain that are not demonstrated or demon-
strable. It is wrong for a man to say he is certain of 
the objective truth of a proposition unless he can pro-
duce evidence which logically justifies that certainty” 
(Stein 1980, 5). 
There are several interesting variations of the above 
positions that emphasize either weak versus strong 
versions or direct couplings of the terms. Those varia-
tions are irrelevant to this article, however, and hence-
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forth will not be mentioned again. Instead, I will argue, 
that a different type of position can be formulated, a 
position based not on ontological or epistemological 
arguments about the existence or nonexistence of the 
gods, but on rights and dignity. 
Historically, many abilities, actions and attitudes have 
been attributed to the gods, and there is no consensus 
regarding what constitutes a god or what attributes 
gods possess (Bullivant and Michael 2013). Accord-
ingly, there is no generic definition of the gods which 
can claim to put a commitment on all religions. How-
ever, one common quality attributed to gods by the 
majority of human beings in most god-based religions 
throughout history seems prima facie, that the gods 
have an influence on human lives and that human be-
ings stand in a submissive relation to the gods, that is, 
human beings owe the gods obedience and respect. 
As the saying goes: “For a theist, a man’s duty is to 
conform to the announced will of God” (Swinburne 
1974). Thus, it implicitly follows that hypothetical 
gods have a right to interfere in human lives and 
existence and even to judge and punish them. This 
continuing right to influence the lives and actions of 
human beings will henceforth be designated as “the 
gods’ right to rule”. 
Primary And Secondary Importance
 
Bertrand Russell was reportedly once asked what he 
would say to a hypothetical god on judgment day if 
he were to come before this god. Russell was delight-
ed with the question and replied that he would tell 
that god: “Not enough evidence God, not enough ev-
idence” (Salmon 1978, 176). 
This answer illustrates what we could call the “gods of 
philosophers”, by which I mean gods who welcome 
those who honestly remain sceptical in the absence 
of evidence, and punish those who embrace belief in 
the gods on the basis of tradition or self-interest. This 
answer represents not only core, but also symptomat-
ic opinion throughout time. For Russell, it was all a 
question of the evidence. The implication here is that 
given sufficient evidence, Russell would ipso facto have 
accepted that god. 
In discussions, the existence of the gods has apparent-
ly always had primacy, where the view has been that 
arguments for or against the existence of the gods are 
of primary importance. Here, I will argue that with 
regard to fundamental democratic values and rights, 
the question of the existence of the gods must assume 
secondary importance, whereas the question of the im-
portance of the gods must assume primary importance. 
Discussions of the gods are roughly based within 
either a ontological frame, for example the various 
forms of ontological proof of a god, which can be de-
fined as follows: “arguments for the conclusion that 
God exists, from premises which are supposed to de-
rive from some source other than observation of the 
world—e.g., from reason alone” (Oppy 2016). In ad-
dition, the discussion of the gods is based on an epis-
temological frame, in which one as Russell inquires 
into the available evidence and how that evidence is 
evaluated. However, I will argue that one vital point 
is overlooked in essentially every discussion about the 
gods’ existence: that the question of whether gods ex-
ist is irrelevant. It is in fact very strange, that so many 
throughout history have placed the question of the 
gods within an ontological or epistemological frame, 
because those, sine qua non, lack a prime component. 
The primary question of the gods’ importance formu-
lated above should be grounded in the normative dis-
cussion of democratic concepts of freedom. This is a 
discussion that I consider as having been overlooked 
in modern philosophical discussions. Thus, what Rus-
sell should have said was not, that there was insuf-
ficient evidence. Instead, he should have asked, why 
exactly he should come before a god to begin with? 
Coming before a god implies that a human being 
is held accountable to that god, that a human being 
must explain himself to that god. I will posit, that this 
continuing acceptance of “the gods right to rule” eo 
ipso is the same as an acceptance of dictatorships. 
Dictatorships
A dictator is a malevolent immoral ruler who wields 
absolute authority. Today, the term dictator has a 
negative meaning, but this has not always been the 
case. The concept originated as the designation of an 
extraordinary supreme magistracy in Rome, applied 
first in military crises and later in domestic ones. A 
dictator was publicly empowered by a magistrate fol-
lowing the authorization of the Roman senate. The 
dictator’s duty was either to lead the army or to head a 
particular task, such as holding elections or suppress-
ing rebellions (Hornblower 1998). Initially, it had an 
overall positive meaning. In an almost similar fash-
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ion, we have the concept tyrant, which was original-
ly a more neutral title by which the Greeks referred 
to a person who had seized authority in a free state, 
where it mattered that: “There was in fact no abso-
lute distinction between turannoi and orthodox lead-
ers in Greek poleis. The former aimed to dominate 
established oligarchies, not to subvert them. It was 
mainstream oligarchic leadership in its most ampli-
fied form, conventional de facto authority writ large” 
(Anderson 2005, 173-222). 
That said, over time, both tyrant and dictator have 
come to be used almost solely as a term for oppres-
sive, even abusive rule. Originally, however, dictators 
stepped down as soon as their task was accomplished, 
and were allowed to stay in office for six months at 
most (Hornblower 1998). Our modern concept of a 
dictator is understood in comparison to democracy, 
and the term is generally used to describe an ille-
gitimate leader who, even if he governed in accord-
ance with justice and fairness, holds an extraordinary 
amount of individual power, especially the power to 
decree laws without effective restraint by an existing 
legislative assembly. Modern conceptions of dictator-
ships are often characterized by some of the following 
traits: overturned civil liberties, rule by decree, the re-
pression of political opponents in a manner inconsist-
ent with the rule of law, and the maintenance of some 
level of popular support (Popper 2000). 
The concept of the gods is likewise an old concept. 
I will argue, that whereas the concepts dictators and 
tyrants have a changed meaning today in the light of 
democracy, the concept of the gods in the philosoph-
ical debate has avoided a similar redefinition, despite 
the fact that the concept of the gods encompasses the 
same negation of democratic rights as the concept of 
a dictator. Historically, of course, the concept of the 
gods is an obvious concept. Human societies have 
primarily gathered around leaders. Throughout his-
tory, they have been led by chieftains and medicine 
men, princes and kings etc., and the gods are a natural 
mental extension of this hierarchy. Therefore, the con-
cept originates from a time when it was commonly 
accepted to be led by a single individual. In later pe-
riods, kings ultimately justified their right to rule as 
“the divine right of kings”, a political and religious 
doctrine of royal absolutism (Burgess 1992). Overall, 
this concept asserts that a monarch answer to no po-
litical authority, deriving the right to rule solely from 
the gods’ award of temporal power. Thus, a king is not 
held accountable to the will of either his people or the 
nobility: only the gods have that authority. 
At the dawn of the Enlightenment, questions were 
asked about the monarch’s superiority and legitima-
cy, and kings were slowly subject to punishment or 
removal for breaking the laws. Since the Enlighten-
ment, the divine right justification has thus fallen out 
of favour. However, what is especially interesting here 
is that those who asked critical questions about kings’ 
rights to rule not simultaneously asked critical ques-
tions about the gods’ right to rule. They did not make 
the extrapolation that I do here, in which I question 
the right to rule not only of kings but also of hypo-
thetical gods. The primary question of absolute gods 
ruling unrestricted remain unaddressed in the philo-
sophical debate, despite that fact that in principle, ab-
solute gods are no more different than absolute kings 
and thus conflict with democracy. 
Leadership in a democratic system can be defined as 
follows: “Government is based on the consent of the 
governed. In a democracy, the people are sovereign—
they are the highest form of political authority. Power 
flows from the people to the leaders of government, 
who hold power only temporarily. Laws and policies 
require majority support in parliament, but the rights 
of minorities are protected in various ways” (Diamond 
2004). We have eliminated kings’ right to rule, but are 
left with gods’ principal right to rule. Where does 
that right come from? What gives the gods the right 
to rule? Their status as deities? Their greater power? 
Greater wisdom? Their creation of human beings? 
Even if the secondary question – whether the gods 
exist – is answered in the affirmative, none of these 
attributes seems to have any fundamental relevance 
with regard to democratic concepts of freedom. 
Pascal’s Wager
One of the most common and most simplistic reasons 
to accept “the gods right to rule” seems historically, 
prima facie, to be based on punishment or reward. An 
illustration of this is given by Pascal’s Wager; the Wa-
ger and Anselm’s Ontological Argument are perhaps 
the most well-known arguments in the philosophy of 
religion. Pascal’s Wager is a practical choice argument 
positing that human beings all gamble with their lives 
either that a god exists or that he does not. Although 
reason cannot settle which alternative we should 
choose, a consideration of our various interests sup-
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posedly can. Based on the assumption that the gains 
are infinite if a deity exists and that there is at least a 
minor probability that a deity actually exists, Pascal 
postulates that a rational person should try to decide 
to believe in and worship this god (Hájek 2012). If it 
turns out that the deity does actually exist, one gains 
the infinite reward of truth and happiness in Heav-
en; if it turns out that the deity does not exist, one 
only has a finite loss, one’s existence simply ends com-
pletely. However, if one gambles on a god not exist-
ing, and spends one’s earthly time on pleasures, luxury, 
etc. without bothering with religion, then if it turns 
out that the deity does exist, one will have lost one’s 
chance for salvation and be destined to an eternity of 
misery in Hell. Pascal concludes at this point that as 
a practical matter, it is overwhelmingly reasonable to 
wager in favour of the deity existing. 
This argument has rightfully been dismissed by point-
ing out that even if its reasoning was somehow sound 
it should then become a major obstacle to convinc-
ing an unprejudiced individual to believe specifically 
in Pascal’s Christian deity. As Diderot (1746) notes: 
“An Imam could reason just as well this way” (Diderot 
1746). By definition following the Christian deity re-
quires the follower to actively negate the existence of 
all the other hypothetical gods. Pascal’s Wager can 
then be viewed as a case of selection bias towards 
one’s particular cultural background. 
It has also been noted that even if for the sake of argu-
ment one agrees with Pascal’s conclusion that ration-
ality requires us to wager for a deity, it still does not 
ipso facto follow that one should wager for this or any 
other god. This is because all that has been granted is 
that this one particular norm, rationality, prescribes 
wagering for a god. It is entirely possible that some 
other norm might prescribe wagering against deities 
(Hájek 2012). For instance, it could then be said, that 
if faced with a plurality of gods, a democratic person 
should wager for those gods who are most passive to-
wards democracy and human beings’ right to auton-
omy. Examples include the belief in a deistic god or 
Epicurean gods in which after death, human beings 
are in the same condition as before their conception, 
and where the gods are uninterested in human beings’ 
existence. 
Nevertheless, all of this once again overlooks what I 
consider the primary point. Wagering for or against 
the gods implicitly assumes, that these gods have a 
right to rule to begin with, and that is the quality that 
I claim the gods do not possess. Once again, the dis-
missal of Pascal’s Wager addresses only the secondary 
question, that is, whether the gods exist, not the pri-
mary question of whether their existence is relevant. 
Why should a democratic person have any interest in 
the gods? Let us assume for the sake of argument that 
there are indeed gods. Even if the gods are assumed 
to exist, why should we worship them? This is a point 
that most discussions rarely address and which Pas-
cal overlooked. Do the gods deserve worship? Do we 
agree with them? The line of thought is that either 
one submits and worships, or else is punished. Those 
gods that advance such choices, are they truly worthy 
of our worship? From the perspective of modern eth-
ics, the issue can also be raised of, whether sentient 
beings should worship other sentient beings at all, 
even if they can obtain goods in such a manner? There 
seems to be an ethical immaturity in the whole idea of 
such a worship and submission relationship. 
Divine Command Theory
Pascal’s Wager is vulgarly based on punishment or 
reward, reasons that are philosophically irresponsible 
and therefore immoral. The more sophisticated reason 
for accepting ”the gods right to rule” is often based 
on divine command theory (many variations could be 
used, but Pascal’s Wager and divine command theo-
ry are representative enough for the present purpose). 
Divine command theory is a moral theory with defi-
nite metaphysical assumptions that states that an ac-
tion’s status as morally good is dependent upon a de-
ity and moral obligation consists of obedience to this 
deity’s commands. The theory thus claims that what is 
morally obligatory, forbidden or permitted is funda-
mentally based on the commands of such a deity and 
that the morally right action is the action commanded 
by that being. In other words, the theory asserts that 
to be moral is to follow a deity’s commands (Austin). 
Past and present adherents of various god-based re-
ligions have often agreed to the notion that the gods’ 
commands are important to morality. Although the 
content of such commands have varied according to 
the views of the specific religious follower, all variations 
of the theory commonly postulate however that mo-
rality and moral obligations fundamentally depend on 
the gods. In some versions, this theory even goes as far 
to entail moral anarchy if the gods do not exist. More 
modern versions include, for instance, divine moti-
Science, Religion & Culture
2016 | Volume 3 | Issue 1 | Page 36                                                      
                              
vation theory, which has attempted to moderate the 
politically improper word commands, instead arguing, 
that deities’ motivations are what we should under-
stand as the foundation of morality (Zagzebski 2004). 
Many obvious objections have been made to divine 
command theory. For example, Wainwright (2005) 
has made the semantic argument that to be com-
manded and to be morally obligated do not contain 
an identical meaning. In addition, he has pointed to 
the epistemic objection that, because divine com-
mand theory requires knowledge of the gods in the 
first place, atheists and agnostics cannot have moral 
knowledge, which they clearly do. Divine command 
theory also entails that followers of godless religions 
(e.g., Buddhism and Daoism, which in their core are 
independent of gods (Gethin 1998; Fasching and de 
Chant 2001) also cannot have moral knowledge. In an 
irony twist, divine command theory also entails that 
nobody in praxis can have moral knowledge because 
the objection to Pascal’s Wager also applies here: giv-
en the sheer number of hypothetical gods, how does 
anyone know which one’s commands or motivations 
to follow? Worse yet, even if a divine command the-
orist believes that his specific religion is correct, he 
continues to confront a plurality of understandings 
within this single religious tradition (Austin). How 
can one separate the gods’ genuine commands from 
those that are only apparent? It is not easy to see how 
one can avoid selection bias. It follows in praxis that 
nobody can be said to be a moral being because most 
human beings do not know the true gods, and the few 
who do cannot know this themselves, thus rendering 
the theory useless. 
Although the above objections all have merits, once 
again we have overlooked the point that even if divine 
command theory were to be true, it would remain a 
dictatorship. Just as Russell’s answer overlooked the 
primary point about democratic concepts of freedom, 
in the discussion of divine command theory one like-
wise sine qua non overlooks the vital point of dem-
ocratic freedom. This theory is a clear example of a 
dictatorship because it negates any form of democra-
cy and moral autonomy. At no time in the discussion 
does it become clear why the gods have a right to de-
mand moral commitment based on their commands 
or motivations. That the gods have a right to command 
because they exist, because they are gods is a circular 
argument that is missing its foundation. Just because 
the gods gives commands, it does not eo ipso follow 
that their morals are satisfactory or that members of a 
normative democracy will agree on those morals. 
It has been postulated that moral terms such as 
“should” and “ought” have obtained a legalistic sense 
because of the Christian religion’s historical influence 
(although it is acknowledged, that a legal conception 
of ethics was not limited to a particular religion) (Ans-
combe 1958). These terms seem to imply an absolute 
verdict, and this entails a judge. A divine law requires, 
of course, that one believe in a deity. However, because 
human beings have eliminated this from the law, they 
should also eliminate the use of moral terms from a 
religious worldview in philosophy itself. 
I will reformulate this point and say that the impor-
tant thing is not that we have abandoned the exist-
ence of the gods and thus cannot reliably base moral 
terms on them: instead, it is important to note that 
in a democracy the gods have no right to give com-
mands to begin with. They have not been chosen in 
an election, they are not governed by a law-giving as-
sembly, and therefore they have no place in a dem-
ocratic system. This normatively stands regardless of 
the gods’ existence or nonexistence. Morality cannot 
be derived from a dictatorship. The important point is 
that in a modern democracy, every human being has 
fundamental rights that cannot be undermined. These 
rights are secured under global law. Every adult hu-
man being has the right to follow his or her own path, 
have his or her own opinions, and to say and write 
what he or she wants. No one can dictate to others 
what to think, feel, believe or say (Diamond 2004). 
The real reason to question such terms is therefore not 
that we no longer prioritize the secondary question. 
Instead, we answer the primary question in that we no 
longer accept dictatorships as a societal order. Thus, 
the role of the gods in a democracy violates the funda-
mental principles of democracy itself. In a democracy 
we might not have an absolute ontic or even an epis-
temic funded ethical system that is applicable at all 
times. However, in a democracy this might pro tanto 
not be a necessity. Through rational debate, laws are 
chosen by elected politicians: these laws secure rights 
and protection to all citizens. Such rights and protec-
tion are the very foundation of moral commitment. 
Democracy 
Democracy is usually contrasted with the concept of 
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dictatorship and is defined as a type of government in 
which power flows from the citizens to the leaders of 
government, who are selected through free elections 
and hold power only temporarily (Diamond 2003). 
The concept first appeared in political philosophy 
in the city-state of Athens during classical antiquity. 
Led by the aristocrat Kleisthenes, the creation of what 
is generally considered the first (restricted) democra-
cy took place in 508–507 BC. That democracy had a 
council of 500 members, with rotating membership 
and limitations on re-election, and every respecta-
ble citizen eventually spent a day as the leader of the 
state’s official executive body (Dunn 1994). 
Popper (2000) defined democracy in contrast to dic-
tatorship or tyranny, stating that every dictatorship is 
morally wrong, which he defined as the basic moral 
principle for democracy, understood as the form of 
nation in which the people control their leaders and 
can remove them without the need for a revolution 
and bloodshed. The power and appeal of democracy 
comes from its promise to render the life of a human 
society as something willed and chosen, and a dic-
tatorship is morally wrong because it forces human 
beings to disregard their better judgment and violate 
their freedom and moral beliefs to collaborate with 
unjust actions thus essentially eliminating human be-
ings’ moral responsibility. 
Modern democracy can be thought of as a political 
system defined using the following four key elements: 
“1. A political system for choosing and replacing the 
government through free and fair elections. 2. The ac-
tive participation of the people, as citizens, in politics 
and civic life. 3. Protection of the human rights of all 
citizens. 4. A rule of law, in which the laws and pro-
cedures apply equally to all citizens” (Diamond 2004). 
More precisely, a democracy is a system in which the 
people have the power and control by a majority vote, 
that is, the majority periodically chooses their politi-
cal leaders. 
The idea behind modern democracy is that it is not 
only a local but also a global system. Since its origin, 
modern democracy has continuously expanded to en-
capsulate an increasing number of nations and cultures 
(Diamond 2003). The goal has been to generalize de-
mocracy as a global system applicable everywhere and 
at all times on this planet. Democracy today is the 
dominant and increasingly the exclusive form of gov-
ernment, clamming to set the standard for legitimate 
authority. The ancient conception of state’s autonomy 
is dissolving under the weight of the international 
scrutiny of domestic leadership (Franck 1992). The 
growing interdependence of nations is increasing-
ly demanding a shared normative expectation that 
all nations seeking international political legitimacy 
must govern with the permission of the governed 
human beings. Because the fundamental principles 
in democracy necessitate, that all leaders be chosen 
by citizens and that it must be possible to select new 
leaders at the next election, then it follows ipso facto 
that democracy is incompatible with a dictatorship, in 
which a leader has unrestricted power independent of 
elections. 
The Gods as Dictators 
We see once again that the concepts of gods, as op-
posed to dictators, have not kept up with modern 
times: hypothetical gods’ right to rule clearly conflicts 
with the points set forth above. With the exception 
of an up-scaled power, what separates a god from a 
normal dictator? Does power give the right to rule 
everything? That the gods have the right to rule be-
cause they are gods has the status of a tautology and 
requires a justification that goes beyond the fact that 
they are gods. That the gods have a right to rule be-
cause they possess greater power or greater knowledge 
is not a sound argument in a democracy. A right to 
rule is not conditional on such qualities in either a 
democratic or an argumentative sense. The gods’ right 
to rule is definitively undemocratic. A world found-
ed on what the gods want will always be a dictatorial 
world in clear conflict with democracy and rights. The 
gods cannot really be considered democratic because 
they have not been elected and their commands do 
not have a formal constitution. Furthermore, they 
cannot be removed from office. There are no controls 
on their power: those who oppose their authority are 
condemned and punished. 
A previously noted, a democracy is a system of rule by 
laws, not by single beings, regardless of their power. In 
a democracy, regardless of its ontic or epistemic status, 
the rule of law protects the rights of human beings, 
maintains order and safety, and restricts the power 
of government. Some might object that we cannot 
apply human standards to the gods. However, this is 
an argument from authority that states that the gods’ 
standards must be applied to humankind instead of 
the standards of human beings being applied to hu-
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mankind, with no justification other than the gods’ 
authority. 
A more sophisticated attempt at an objection might 
be that gods are not individuals in the same way that 
we understand human beings as individuals, which 
should mean that we cannot discuss democracy and 
rights on an equal level between human beings and the 
gods. Thus, we make an ontological distinction: that is, 
in metaphysics the different kinds of being are defined 
as categories of being (Thomasson 2013). A deity is 
thus not just “a being”, but a ”Being Itself ”, not merely 
singular as one, even a supreme and self-existent one, 
but as the “Power of Being” by which any finite thing 
exists. A human being is limited in space and time, 
finite, conditioned on something else, whereas the de-
ity must be absolute at the top. Anything less than the 
absolute, the unconditioned, cannot really according 
to this line of thought be a god. 
Long complex discussions of what a god should be 
defined as have been attempted. However, as stated 
in the introduction, none of the arguments for the 
gods’ attributes have been successful, or even obtained 
a generic status among the gods’ followers worldwide. 
More importantly in this discussion, from the per-
spective of normative democracy, all this is irrelevant. 
Why should a distinction between such categories, 
in defining being, be important? In principle, it is no 
more important than a discussion of how a hypothet-
ical alien species with a different being than humans 
stands. Regardless of whether gods or powerful aliens 
with the attributes of finite beings, infinite beings, 
first beings, perfect beings, etc. make demands to rule, 
there is still no commitment. In terms of leadership, 
there is no explanation about why one being should 
possess a right to rule another being. 
Moreover, the application of such categories of being 
again represents an example of selection bias towards 
one’s own deities. A concept from existing religions 
is that of a belief in demigods, an individual with 
one human being as a parent, and one god as another 
(York 2015). Where exactly should these demigods be 
placed in the categories? What being do they have? 
Universalization of Equal Status 
As noted above, the principles underlying democracy 
should not cease from being local to become global, 
but must proceed further from being global to be-
come universal. By being universal these principles 
encapsulate the entire universe, or all universes. This 
universalization extends the expansion of and argu-
mentation for democracy. Because democracy applies 
globally, it also does so universally: all leaders must be 
chosen and can be replaced by new leaders in the next 
election. Both in global and in universal democracy, it 
follows that dictators have no right to rule. Both glob-
ally and universally, the gods’ right to rule is viewed as 
a violation of democratic principles. The members of a 
democracy have equal status, and if this status general-
izes to universal applicability, then it follows that hu-
man beings are not second class compared to the gods. 
The ontic or epistemic status of human beings and 
gods is irrelevant when we discuss democratic rights. 
However, the supporters of the gods’ rights might ob-
ject that I discuss only the rights in the world of the 
living whereas they believe that the gods have a right 
to rule when human beings supposedly steps into the 
world of the non-living. Nevertheless, the answers to 
this objection are that philosophical justification only 
changes in light of new philosophical arguments, not 
by human beings moving to a new “environment”, as 
the believers in an afterlife somewhat unclear seems 
to think. Even in this scenario, we continue to lack a 
normative justification of the gods’ right to rule. 
A common reason to this right is stated as follows: the 
gods created human beings and thus have a right to 
rule because human beings are, so to speak, their prop-
erty (Swinburne 1974). However, this is not a sound 
argument in a democracy, and as an argument, it does 
eo ipso not follow that the gods should have created 
human beings and thus have a right to rule human-
kind. It seems that hypothetical gods’ right to rule 
is ultimately founded on power. However, is a pow-
er-based justification an ethically justified argument? 
Let us consider first an example from tauromachy. In 
bullfighting, a bull will be forced to fight against a 
matador de toros, surrounded by a cheering crowd. 
The event ultimately will end with the death of the 
bull. The bullfighter’s action is justified from power. 
He tortures and kills the bull simply because he has 
the power to do so. All other attempts to appeal to 
ethical arguments seem quite doubtful. Because the 
entire situation is founded on a justification from 
power, then let us analyse the situation from the bull’s 
perspective. What if the bull succeeds in killing the 
bullfighter instead, and further, that the bull is clever 
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and daring enough to kill everyone in its way (includ-
ing those who breed it, its creators, so to speak), such 
that it can escape the arena and flee to safety in the 
countryside? Is this an ethically justifiable action? The 
bullfighter’s justification from power allowed him to 
torture and kill the bull, whereas the bull’s justifica-
tion from power allowed it to defend its life and gain 
its freedom. The ethical justification appears to be in 
favour of the bull. However, an objection can be made 
that the bullfighter and the bull belong to two differ-
ent species and thus different beings, and that an ethi-
cal analysis should take this into consideration. In this 
case, one can ask why? Both scenarios are founded on 
a justification from power. If the tormented manages 
to kill its tormentor and achieve its freedom, then the 
very same justification from power should apply. 
An argument with a similar structure – but that em-
bodies a more Hobbesian understanding could involve 
a seventeenth-century plantation owner who decides 
to torture and kill a slave. The people in Hobbes’ Le-
viathan had no rights whatsoever against their sover-
eign. This sovereign or dictator could do as he pleased 
with them, even deliberately harm them, and the peo-
ple would have no morally valid grievance against the 
dictator (Hood 1964). If the slave were to succeed in 
killing the plantation owner and fleeing to safety in 
another part of the world, then the ethical justification 
would appear to favour the ex-slave. In a Hobbesian 
understanding, however, this is not the case. Accord-
ing to Hobbes, the dictator had a certain duty to treat 
people well, but this duty was owed not to the people 
themselves but to a god, similar to how people might 
have a duty to others to treat their property well. Of 
course, they would have no duty to the property itself 
but merely to its owner. Depending on the outcome 
either the plantation owner or the ex-slave would 
stand accountable to the god for killing its property. 
If we simplify the situation by removing the middle-
man, that is, the human dictator, and rerun the same 
argument again, with real-life gods doing the same to 
human beings and the human beings repeating the 
action of the bull or the ex-slave, would those beings, 
despite belonging to two different beings, not have 
an ethical right to fight for freedom? All of these ar-
guments are founded on a justification from power 
anyway. 
In summary, a fundamental principle in democracy is 
that all of its members have full and equal status. All 
of the various privileges that throughout history have 
been given to individual humans and families have 
systematically been phased out in democratic socie-
ties. In other words, there are no longer second classes 
and first classes of human beings among humankind. 
If this fundamental principle is generalized to be uni-
versally applicable, then it follows by extension that 
human beings are not second class compared to hy-
pothetical gods or aliens. 
It might be objected that the discussion of democracy 
is based on a normative foundation, whereas the dis-
cussion of the gods’ right to rule is based on a factual or 
ontological foundation. However, no claims regarding 
gods can be said to find factual support. Nor has any 
convincing ontological foundation been established 
for the gods (Oppy 2006). What remains is that “the 
gods’ right to rule”, perhaps like democracy, is based 
on a normative foundation. And because democracy 
secures freedom of religion (and consequently free-
dom from religion) then it follows that democracy au-
tomatically arranges the supporters of the gods’ nor-
mative rights as a part itself, but not above itself, and 
thus normative democracy takes precedence. Further-
more, even if the gods existed, the response would be 
that the gods’ right to rule would still not be obvious, 
except from being based on a justification from power. 
A democratic human being, there on the one hand 
accepts democracy, but on the other hand also accepts 
the gods’ right to rule, thus finds himself in a contra-
dictory position, lacking support of democracy. 
Rights and Dignity 
It can be stated that the principles of democracy are 
derived from the basic idea that each individual hu-
man being has a right to both liberty and political 
equality. Democracy is thus an extension of the gener-
al idea that each human being should to be the ruler of 
his or her own existence. A legal system can be viewed 
as a distribution of personal freedom that establishes 
rules specifying which citizen is free to act in which 
ways and which citizen should be free from undesired 
actions and conditions. Drawing on a long tradition 
of thought produced over centuries by legal philos-
ophers, a legal system can be viewed as a complex, 
layered structure of guaranteed rights (Wenar 2015). 
Ancient people did not uphold the same conception 
of global rights as people do today. The beginning of 
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rights was most likely that even the most rudimenta-
ry social order must encompass rules specifying that 
some individuals or groups have special permission or 
restrictions related to the performance of certain ac-
tions (Wenar 2015). The true forerunner of individual 
human rights discourse was, however, the concept of 
natural rights that achieved dominance during Eu-
rope’s Enlightenment. This rights theory has contin-
ued to advance, viewing rights such as life, liberty, and 
property as fundamental and applicable everywhere 
and at all times in the sense of being global. 
The idea of rights has proceeded from a local to an in-
creasingly global perception. Therefore, if we proceed 
further from a globalized idea to a universalized one 
then it again stands, that the gods’ right to rule will be 
viewed as a violation of these rights. As in the case of 
democracy, it is especially interesting, that those who 
fought for the introduction of rights did not simulta-
neously question the gods’ right to negate these very 
rights. For example, we have Jefferson’s Declaration 
of Independence (1776): “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pur-
suit of Happiness” (Becker 1970, 5). They did not per-
form the extrapolation made here in which I question 
the right to violate the rights of not only humans with 
power but also gods to violate human beings’ rights. 
A god apparently has the right to negate these rights 
by virtue of simply being a god analogous to a king 
negating these rights by virtue of simply being a king. 
Furthermore, a right or quality beyond the realm of 
rights of conduct that can be mentioned is dignity, 
which expresses the concept that a human being has 
a right to be valued and respected (Rosen 2012). Dig-
nity is not simply a word: it also represents a hope 
or declaration that human existence in the reali-
ty in which it takes place may come to be more of 
a question of internal and external respect and less 
of a question of enforced obedience to interpersonal 
and external legal demands. In many ways, dignity is 
an extension of the Enlightenment’s ideals of rights, 
from which it follows that human beings owe each 
other a certain inviolable respect and right. In other 
words, dignity entails that sentient beings shall not 
submit to or worship each other, regardless of their 
power and knowledge. 
It is not easy to justify the inherent dignity of a spe-
cies compared to another species, considering that we 
now know that all life shares a common origin (Kam-
pourakis 2014). Although perhaps dignity need not 
be inherent, but assumed because we choose to take 
the existential leap, that it shall be thus. There are no 
gods that give us our dignity or more correctly, that 
have a right to either give or take our dignity. 
Heroical Apatheism 
Based on this discussion, it follows that it is unneces-
sary for those who agree with the presented conclu-
sions to designate themselves as either atheists or ag-
nostics because the existence of the gods as discussed 
is not the primary question. In a sense, designations 
should be unnecessary: however, if they are necessary, 
then I would suggest the term “heroical apatheism” 
for the apatheian principle that I advance. In a sense, 
this term simply refers to the democratic values, fun-
damentalis democratia, rigorously applied. 
Apatheism 
A lack of interest in the existence of the gods most 
likely has a long history. Thus wrote Diderot in re-
sponse to Voltaire: “It is very important not to mis-
take hemlock for parsley; but not at all so to believe 
or not in God” (Herrick 1985, 75). It appears that the 
term apatheism first appeared in an article by Rauch 
(2003). It is a combination of two words: “Apathy” 
and “Theism” or “Apathy and “Atheism.” Apatheism is 
here defined as: “a disinclination to care all that much 
about one’s own religion, and an even stronger disin-
clination to care about other people’s. Apatheism con-
cerns not what you believe but how. In that respect it 
differs from the standard concepts used to describe 
religious views and people, apatheism is an attitude, 
not a belief system” (Rauch 2003). 
This type of apatheism is thus a form of indifference 
that fundamentally represents an absence or lack of 
interest in questions involving deities and religious 
postulates. An apatheist has no interest in accepting 
or denying any postulates regarding the existence or 
nonexistence of deities. Apatheism can fall under 
pragmatic atheism (Robinson 2012) if by this one 
means negative atheism, whereas it cannot be said to 
fall under positive atheism, because this notion strictly 
expresses that gods do not exist, whereas apatheism 
can entail beliefs in gods (Rauch 2003). Apatheism 
can fall under pragmatic agnosticism, but it is im-
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portant to emphasize that once again there exists an 
asymmetry here. Most agnostics are apatheists, but 
many apatheists are not agnostics. It is entirely possi-
ble for apatheists to be believers (Rauch 2003). How-
ever, these definitions of apatheism are in many ways 
different from my own definition. The above only ad-
dresses the secondary question: “This is the view that 
millennia of debate has neither proven nor disproven 
the existence of a god or gods. However, even if one 
or more deities exist, they do not appear to be con-
cerned about the fate of humans. Thus, their existence 
has little impact on humanity and should be of little 
interest” (Robinson 2012). Thus, it takes the shape of 
a pragmatic agnosticism, which provides that because 
the gods do not seem to have importance in the lives 
of human beings, there is no reason to dedicate time 
to the matter until their existence or influence has 
been demonstrated. 
As noted above, my approach is different because it 
addresses the primary question. My definition is di-
rected more specifically toward the god concept and 
the gods’ status in comparison to human beings. My 
position is, as I have stated so far: it is not a ques-
tion of whether the gods seem to have little impact 
on humankind, but that the existence of the gods is 
irrelevant, and this is what I mean by apatheism. I will 
henceforth refer to my own definition and position as 
heroical apatheism. A heroical apatheist considers the 
question of the existence or nonexistence of deities to 
be fundamentally irrelevant in every way that matters. 
It is very important to specify that a heroical apathe-
ist shall not be understood as someone who doubts, 
a sceptic, in a manner similar to that of, for exam-
ple, atheists or agnostics who question the existence 
of the gods or what we can know about the gods. A 
heroical apatheist is precisely not a sceptic because the 
primary question is not the gods’ existence, which is 
the secondary question. The primary question is the 
gods’ importance. 
One of the most common religious postulates for the 
gods’ importance is that only in deities can human be-
ings find true and lasting happiness. The gods provide 
purpose to human existence and loving such deities 
fulfils us as human beings (Nielsen 1973). A more 
vulgar postulate is that the gods are the creators of 
human beings who thus somehow have an obligation 
to please their benefactors. Because the gods are the 
creators of this world and in all likelihood have not 
ceded ownership of it, then the gods are also its own-
ers, that is, both everything and everybody are their 
property (Swinburne 1974). Thus, it is only by having 
faith in and pleasing the gods that human beings can 
find purpose in their existence. 
The obvious prima facie reply to this is, for example as 
Nielsen note that we simply do not have any evidence 
for the existence of deities. Thus, Nielsen (1973,  22-
41) rightfully places himself in line with Russell. Be-
cause of the lack of such evidence or proof, the religious 
believer’s postulate that human nature is fulfilled only 
in relationship to deities is unjustified. Unfortunately, 
from this line of reasoning it ipso facto follows that, if 
one day we do in fact possess evidence of the exist-
ence of the gods, then it would follow that the gods 
provide purpose to the existence of human beings. 
However, the fundamental attitude of a heroical apa-
theist is that the gods’ existence will not provide pur-
pose to human beings regardless, and they certainly 
do not consider themselves property. Human beings 
are not second class in the universe, which juridically, 
ethically and existentially is ruled by others. Therefore, 
the existence of gods is not rejected for ontological or 
epistemic reasons – for democratic or existential rea-
sons, it is deemed unnecessary. This is not an arrogant, 
hubris-like attempt to elevate human beings above 
the gods, as might be objected. It is simply universal-
ization of the fundamental democratic principle that 
there are no first- and second-class humans and that 
among other species or beings (including hypotheti-
cal gods or aliens elsewhere in the universe), human 
beings also are not second class. 
The unique attitude of a heroical apatheist is that if 
one day it were possible to obtain proof that the gods 
in fact exist, then their attitude and behaviour would 
not change. Likewise, there would be no change in 
their attitude and behaviour, if we obtained proof that 
the gods do not exist. A heroical apatheist considers 
the existence or nonexistence of deities as neither pro-
viding meaning nor purpose to their own existence: 
the gods neither give direction to life nor have any 
right to influence. That the gods can possess great-
er power, knowledge, be eternal, etc., is stringently 
irrelevant from the heroical apatheists point of view. 
According to the heroical apatheist, it would not be 
meaningful to live according to another’s meaning. If 
meaning were dictated to us by others, then it would 
ipso facto not be a meaning for us, it would be meaning 
for others. According to this apatheian principle, hu-
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man beings would be degraded, not elevated, by hav-
ing their purpose and existence dictated by the gods. 
It could be objected, that if we do not submit to the 
gods’ right to rule, there is no basis for any meaning 
or hope of justice, safety or better times. The opposite 
question could be asked, however. If there are gods 
and their right to rule is accepted, what basis is there 
for any meaning or hope of justice, safety or better 
times? If the gods’ rule is accepted, then human be-
ings are slaves or puppets. All of the strings, even our 
lives, are in their hands. In that situation, there is no 
hope of enlightenment, freedom and protection of 
equal rights and dignity. The gods would set all of the 
rules, without input from others. That is dictatorship. 
The answer to the question is simple and obvious for 
anyone who does not consider human beings wholly 
worthless: things can become better because of human 
effort. Things have become better because of human 
effort, and there are virtually unlimited amounts of 
hope and justice, safety and every other aspect of bet-
ter times as long as we are willing to fight and make 
sacrifices for both ourselves and our fellow beings. 
Insight from evolutionary biology has taught us that 
living beings, including human beings, do not seem 
to have any ultimate built-in function that they must 
fulfil, humans were not made for anything with a tel-
eological direction. Nevertheless, this insight need not 
lead to, say, nihilism. As noted by Nielsen (1973), a 
separation can be made between two types of purpose. 
First, one can respond to the claim regarding a built-
in purpose as follows: “that if man were not made for 
a purpose, his life must be without purpose actually is 
offensive for it involves treating man as a kind of tool 
as merely serving a purpose”. According to Nielsen 
(1973) the standard objection that there must be de-
ities in order to have a purpose for human existence 
trades on confusion. Because second, it is important 
to understand that there can be purpose in life even 
if there is no purpose to life. There does not seem to 
be a purpose for human beings qua humans, but hu-
man beings can have purpose in their existence be-
cause human beings have goals, intentions, emotions, 
and motives, all of which remain intact regardless of 
the apparent fact that existence is purposeless in the 
larger sense. In this more specific sense, things matter 
to sentient beings, regardless of the gods’ existence or 
nonexistence. 
Furthermore, even for sake of argument, if we assume 
that there indeed is an inherent purpose in life itself, 
why equate it with the gods? I could reformulate the 
Euthyphro dilemma to concern itself with meaning 
or purpose instead of morality, and then it would fol-
low that purpose is independent of what any of the 
gods thinks, wants, or prefers. 
For a heroical apatheist, the existence of the gods is 
thus not one of the so-called grand questions in life. 
Their lives would not change at all if anyone could 
provide evidence of the gods’ existence. Of course, 
they would recognize the gods’ existence in this case – 
and properly find it exciting, but they would not sub-
mit to their authority, precisely because human beings 
are not second class compared to the gods. Heroical 
apatheism is thus not based on a lazy attitude towards 
the god question in which one is not interested in the 
questions of the possible existence of the gods. In-
stead, it is based on a consequentially thorough con-
sideration of the idea of equal rights. 
Heroical 
What about the term “heroical?” Why is a term that 
describes indifference paradoxically described as “he-
roic,” an active adjective?” In truth, the designation 
“militant apatheist” could also have been applied (Von 
Hegner 2010, 240), but the term heroical signals more 
positive and personal qualities, that are not necessarily 
warlike. Heroical means having or displaying quali-
ties appropriate for heroes. The word is fitting to use 
here because it is an ancient term from the Latin word 
herõs, derived from Greek, which itself is likely even 
older with a Pre-Greek origin (Beekes 2009). The 
term literally means “protector” or “defender” (Harp-
er 2001-2016). This very ancient term represents 
qualities showing the best and (in this specific case) 
that which is the most important in human beings. 
A herõs is an individual who, when confronted with 
danger or injustice, fights adversity through impres-
sive feats of strength, courage, resolve and pride, often 
disregarding their own personal concerns for a higher 
good, such as the right to be one’s own lord in one’s 
own existence with dignity. 
The term heroical is a pragmatic response to the fol-
lowing two scenarios:
The Political Objection
In an ideal world, that is, a world in which religious 
freedom and (by extension) freedom from religions 
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are upheld and respected, it would be sufficient to be 
an apatheist. Sadly, however, the world is not this way. 
In many countries, there are demands regarding the 
upholding or respect of numerous traditions or rules 
based on the local god or religion. For instance, in the 
USA, there is a custom many places that before tes-
tifying in court or taking a political office, one must 
swear an oath on a holy book (Epstein 1996). If one 
swears alliance to the country, this likewise involves 
swearing alliance to a god and so forth. This custom 
continues in many places, although as a matter of con-
stitutional law, one has the right to declare non-belief 
or take an oath based on a solemn affirmation, if one 
requests this in advance (Epstein 1996). 
One situation in which this freedom of choice does 
not exist involves “In God We Trust”, the official mot-
to of the USA since 1956 (Epstein 1996). This mot-
to was first legally challenged in 1970, but the Court 
ruled: “It is quite obvious that the national motto 
and the slogan on coinage and currency “In God We 
Trust” has nothing whatsoever to do with the estab-
lishment of religion” (Aronow V. United States 1970). 
This conclusion makes no sense, of course, consider-
ing that gods are a concept from religion and in this 
case from a specific monotheistic religion, thus violat-
ing the religious freedom of both nonreligious peo-
ples and followers of other religions. This motto is also 
frequently exhibited in the courtroom itself, where it 
can be seen behind the judge. A person requested to 
appear at a trial at which this motto is displayed will 
have his freedom from religion implicitly violated by 
the very institution that should protect it. 
Similar examples can be found in most Western soci-
eties. In Denmark, for instance, section 4 of the Con-
stitution provides that: “The Evangelical Lutheran 
Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, 
and as such shall be supported by the State” (The 
Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5th 1953). 
Each year before members of the parliament meet for 
their official opening and the prime minister’s open-
ing speech, all are expected to meet at Christiansborgs 
church to hear the opening sermon. This is not man-
datory by law, but it is considered proper behaviour 
toward one’s colleagues. Of course, some politicians 
have objected to this mingling of politics and religion 
(Qureshi 2009). 
Notwithstanding the formal existence of religious 
freedom (and by extension, freedom from religion, 
and in extension thereof, freedom from the gods) 
in Western societies, in praxis, most humans remain 
obliged to abide by diverse religious injunctions. Al-
though one is indifferent to the existence of the gods, 
it does not follow that one automatically does not 
care about personal freedom and self-respect. To be 
an heroical apatheist in this case simply means that 
one stands by one’s right to freedom from the gods, 
first by politely refusing to participate in diverse rit-
uals and if this still is not sufficient, then to make a 
more active and less polite refusal. Thus, the purpose 
of this term is to indicate that one is ready to stand 
firm or fight for one’s democratic right or dignity, 
analogous to, say, a heroical democrat ready to fight 
against a tyrant. Being indifferent to something also 
means an increased chance of exploitation, providing 
a foundation for tyranny. Therefore, to be a heroical 
apatheist means that one will not accept the dicta-
tion of religious rules about what and what not to 
do. Although we should maintain respect for people’s 
right to believe what they want, this is not the same 
as maintaining respect for the content in their beliefs. 
No violations of the right to freedom from religions 
and gods will be respected.
The Religious Objection  
In an ideal world, that is, a world in which the threats 
of (hypothetical or factual) dictators taking pow-
er does not exist, it would be sufficient to be an ap-
atheist. What if, however, one or more of the gods 
actually showed themselves to humankind tomor-
row and their existence became a fact? If they were 
conclusively shown to exist, then heroical apatheists 
would obviously recognize their existence. However, 
it would be interesting in the same way as if human-
kind finally made contact with an alien species. How-
ever, they would not submit themselves to those gods, 
they would not worship them, and they definitely 
would not trust them because they do not agree with 
the gods’ antidemocratic ideals and actions. Heroical 
apatheists would continue to exercise their personal 
freedom and be the best human beings possible. The 
simple reason is that those heroical apatheists exist in 
a democracy, which is something that they intend to 
continue to do. In other words, they deny the gods’ 
right to interfere in their lives or in world events. Be-
cause, are the gods different from dictators? Have we 
chosen the gods? Will they resign from office if a ma-
jority of human beings would have them removed? 
The next issue that arises is what if despite our pro-
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test, real-life gods take control anyway, perhaps with 
the dictum, say, that their will is the causally necessary 
and sufficient condition of the existence of contin-
gent human beings, which leads to the gods’ worth as 
subjects of worship, that is, the conjecture, that there 
is somehow a type of relation between existence and 
submission, that they have an demand on absolute 
devotion and unconditional commitment, regard-
less of democracy and rights. What happens in that 
situation? Well, such gods will be tyrants, wordy of 
neither respect nor worship, but only contempt from 
any democratic life form. As ethical beings, we would 
be obliged to find a way to slay such tyrants. Such 
beings should not be obeyed, but instead should be 
fought with all our strength and put on trial, accused 
of crimes against humankind. That democratic rights 
have been suppressed by the use of force does not en-
tail that the philosophical status of democratic rights 
have been undermined, only that they have been sup-
pressed until heroic freedom fighters have restored 
them. 
In this manner, heroical apatheism becomes heroi-
calism. Rights deprived by force can also be retaken 
by force. In modern times, many dictators have ex-
perienced a similar end to their dictatorships when 
freedom fighters instituted democracy. In principle, 
there is no reason that this situation could not be re-
peated here. Whether it is human dictators or god 
dictators, play, as this discussion has made clear, no 
principal difference. In this case, to be a heroical apa-
theist means to stand up for one’s rights regardless of 
whom one is standing against. Of course, supporters 
of the gods will claim that such a fight for democracy 
is absurd because the gods possess greater power than 
human beings, and such a fight will not result in suc-
cess. The proper response to this objection might be 
that this is a question of a leap of faith on behalf of 
the freedom fighters, and faith, as the saying goes, is 
beyond reason. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Despotism is a political form of leadership in which 
a single individual rules with absolute power. The at-
traction of democracy, in contract, comes from the 
idea of autonomy, of sentient beings choosing freely 
for themselves. It has been claimed that: “Today, there 
are no global rivals to democracy as a broad model 
of government. Communism is dead. Military rule 
everywhere lacks appeal and normative justification. 
One-party states have largely disappeared. For what 
single party, in this day and age, can credibly claim the 
wisdom and moral righteousness to rule indefinitely 
and without criticism or challenge?” (Diamond 2003). 
There is in fact one remaining: the acceptance of the 
gods’ right to rule is, in praxis an acceptance of a the-
ocracy. Although there is philosophical debate regard-
ing the rights of religions to allow religiously-based 
law to influence the political system, this debate is 
primarily based on how this can be done without vio-
lating religious freedom. Those who posit that democ-
racy today is confronted by no serious threats might 
say that a democratic society regularly passes laws in-
dependent of what hypothetical gods are postulated 
to command. They are partially correct in this and in 
truth, democratic societies are forced to do so, other-
wise a violation of freedom from religions would re-
sult. Nevertheless, freedom from religions also entails 
freedom from the gods. Therefore, my approach fo-
cuses on the notion that the very idea of gods as rulers 
itself equates to dictatorship. In the Western world, 
supporters of theocracy may belong in a minority, so 
in that regard there is no practical threat against de-
mocracy. However, the fact that the acceptance of the 
gods’ right to rule is so commonly accepted by dem-
ocratically minded citizens, and is not meet with ob-
jections represents a challenge for democratic thought 
and philosophy itself. 
In this article, I have argued that if the concept of 
democracy generalizes to a universal status, then the 
concept of hypothetical gods’ right to rule will assume 
status of a dictatorship. The many and diverse justifi-
cations for the gods’ right to rule are all irrelevant in 
the democratic context just as justifications for dicta-
tors are irrelevant. 
Some supporters of the gods’ right to rule might con-
sider the previous analyses as representing defiance or 
rebelliousness. However, defiant implies the defini-
tion that there is someone to be defiant against: the 
relation to be defied and to be a defier necessitates 
that the one being defied has a right resulting in defi-
ance. This is the point that is being questioned. There 
are no rightful rulers to begin with. Naturally, some 
modern supporters of “the gods’ right to rule” might 
say that there is a choice, that one can submit to the 
gods’ dictatorial will or not. However, this can be dis-
cussed. Pascal’s Wager and divine command theory 
exemplifies the orthodox attitude. The choice consists 
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of either letting oneself be ruled by the gods or pun-
ished, either being moral or not being moral. There 
apparently is no third option, namely to live in peace 
and lord one’s own existence. The heroical apatheist 
will disagree with all of these possibilities because he 
or she does not recognize the gods’ rights to begin 
with. The apatheian principle marks that these three 
possibilities cannot be established to begin with be-
cause this implies some sort of negotiations with the 
gods. However, the gods have no negotiation right. 
A possible objection to equate the rights of gods and 
human beings, and my subsequent inquiry about, 
what right the gods should have to rule, could be that 
rights and wrongs should arise out of an external law 
in relation to which actions stand. What this should 
mean is that there then must be a juridical imperative 
outside the system of democracy itself that dictates 
that one should follow this specific democratic sys-
tem, which means that the system of democracy is not 
justified by itself. 
To this, one can as a first answer practically note that 
if a well-ordered world society is to work, human be-
ings must not only participate in and exercise their 
rights but also must observe core principles and rules 
of conduct. Every human being must value the rights 
and dignity of his or her fellow humans as sentient 
beings. This value is essentially upheld in the most ad-
vanced democratic societies, thus demonstrating that 
democracy functions excellently without an external 
imperative. Perhaps more importantly, it functions 
even without a rigorous philosophical justification. In 
a modern democracy, laws are passed completely in-
dependent of dictates from hypothetical gods, where 
laws emerge from rational discussion and are passed 
by elected politicians in majority decisions. 
Democratic laws already principally disregard the 
rights of the gods. Thus, an Abraham attempting to 
kill Isaac, or an Agamemnon actually killing Iphi-
genia, would today be arrested and convicted regard-
less of any justification based on the gods’ commands. 
Whether the command to kill comes from divine 
command or from schizophrenia, the demands of 
human rights in a democracy take precedence. Sup-
pose, however, we take one additional step further and 
eliminates the middlemen in that scenario, resulting 
in real-life gods attempting to kill children. Such an 
action should be justified by the gods’ right to a sus-
pension of what we consider ethical? Will citizens 
in a democracy continue – in principle – to attempt 
to protect the children? In this case, when the com-
mands, motivations or actions of gods, regardless of 
their ontic status, collide with the demands of moral-
ity, res ipsa loquitur, in a just and democratic society, 
morality should take precedence regardless of its epis-
temic status and the children be protected. 
Nevertheless, what the above objection, that there 
must be some type of juridical imperative outside 
the system of democracy that justifies adherence to 
this specific system really mean, is that the discussion 
could be different, if there is a separation between the 
gods that exist under the same conditions as the rest 
of the universe’s inhabitants and the gods that exist 
outside the universe. The first group could have creat-
ed human beings, whereas the latter could have cre-
ated both human beings and the universe. However, 
does a conception outside of the universe have any 
meaning? This notion originates from the assump-
tion that a transcendental point of view is possible. 
A classic example of such a view is Pierre-Simon de 
Laplace’s example. Niels Bohr considered this view 
a philosophical mistake. Thus, he argued that both 
idealism and materialism are mistaken conceptions 
derived from the conception about a last subject that 
should be able to view the universe from outside (Fa-
vrholdt 1994). 
Bohr’s philosophical point is that one’s surroundings 
are always observed under conditions determined 
by the fact that everyone is part of the universe. This 
means that we must apply our concepts in a certain 
interdependent way to think and communicate un-
ambiguously. We are a part of the reality that we 
observe: therefore we must continuously draw a line 
between subject and object if we are to describe an-
ything. Thus, human beings are in the universe and 
cannot see it from without. It is not even possible to 
ascribe any meaning to this word. We are forced to 
describe the universe as being part of it, one could 
attempt to say, as “seen within,” but the whole point 
is that both the expression “seen outside” and the ex-
pression “seen within” are meaningless. Thus, it fol-
lows that one must follow certain conditions for de-
scriptions dictated by the structure of the world. It is 
not possible for us either to transcend them or to sug-
gest alternative conditions for description (Favrholdt 
1994).These fundamental conditions for description 
are not a contingent fact: instead, everybody – hu-
man beings and gods alike – must abide by them in 
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order to have meaningful communication. However, 
even if (for the sake of argument) it was granted that 
there somehow are gods outside the universe, it still 
would not be clear at all why those gods should pos-
sess a right to bypass the democratic autonomy that is 
agreed on within democracy. 
There remains much to discuss. Are democracy and 
rights truly sufficiently justified and self-sustaining? 
This notion has been criticized in different ways: one 
of the main objections is that in the democratic sys-
tem, there are often major disagreements, and the po-
litical system is capable of enforcing solutions over the 
objections of the minority. This represents a problem 
with rights and freedom for all. Perhaps the primary 
strength of democracy is only that it ultimately pre-
vents dictatorships, whereas rights will always seem 
like a cogent argument? 
Furthermore, that different species have different 
rights also raises fundamental questions (MacClellan 
2012). Both versions of natural law – divine and Ar-
istotelian natural law – ground natural rights as mor-
al demands derived from the nature of things itself 
instead of from agreements. As has been discussed 
up to this point, hypothetical gods have no right to 
rule over human beings. However, it is also not easy 
to justify human beings’ inherent rights compared to 
other animals. Thanks to natural science, it is now 
well known that there is no real dividing line sepa-
rating human beings from their nonhuman ancestors. 
Six million years ago in Africa, a non-human ape had 
children that went on to evolve along three divergent 
lines into humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos, but 
nowhere along those lines of nearly a million gener-
ations did any offspring appear to be particularly dif-
ferent from the parent generation. Nevertheless, there 
were non-human apes at the beginning and there are 
human (apes) beings at the end of one line of descend 
in the present day (Silver 2006). This clearly repre-
sents a problem for the discussion of inherent rights. 
There is no fixed nature that defines human beings 
and dictates what will be morally appropriate for the 
realization of human essence. On what are these rights 
based? Why should only one species on this planet 
have them? This represents unclarified questions that 
we do not have time to address here; however, perhaps 
sentiocentrism points in a fruitful direction. 
Democracy is a very simple idea in its appeal and 
power: perhaps it is too simple. In some ways, my 
treatment might have been too rough and as is com-
mon in philosophy, much of the presented analyses 
and discussions could have been longer. Nevertheless, 
if one considers overall that democracy represents the 
best political and ethical system that we have, by ex-
tension, it follows that one must agree that dictators, 
regardless of their nature, must be disregarded. If one 
does not consider democracy to be sufficiently justi-
fied and self-contained one likely will not agree with 
this discussion. In that event, it is up to the dissenter, 
in the philosophical and juridical debate to explain 
why dictatorship is better than democracy. 
I have attempted to keep the discussion within the 
frame-work of a normative democratic juridical argu-
mentation. Nevertheless, it is likely that the argumen-
tation for heroical apatheism could also have been 
advanced as a declaration of independence or a mani-
festo in which one takes a leap in a kind of existential 
declaration, dignitas humanitas, and outright pro tanto 
proclaims that human beings shall choose freedom 
and follow their own path, simply because we choose 
to do so. The slave killing his tormenter achieves his 
freedom: does he really need anything more than a pro 
tanto justification for this act? 
Are there things greater than human beings? Of 
course. The universe is greater than human beings, 
and this is something that each of us confronts every 
day. However, something being greater does not en-
tail it being worshipped. In short, there is no relation 
between existence and worship. Where does this mis-
understanding come from? One can draw attention 
to two distinct evolutionary features in human beings 
that are relevant to this connection. The first is that 
throughout history, human beings have instinctive-
ly been social animals (Van Vugt, Hogan and Kaiser 
2008). This instinct has first created pack leaders and 
in accordance with our increasing intelligence and 
more complex culture, this instinct reasonably led first 
to chieftains and medicine men and then to kings and 
hypothetical gods. Second, human beings have an in-
stinctive need to experience awe and wonder in their 
lives, to feel connected to something greater (Kelt-
ner and Haidt 2003). Throughout history, this need 
has led to our greatest creations: science, philosophy, 
art and poetry, etc. However, over time these two in-
stincts have become confused with each other, have 
become so entangled that almost no one can tell the 
difference anymore, and the instincts to follow and 
submit become intertwined with the need to feel awe 
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and wonder. Thus, when our instinct to follow is su-
perimposed on our instinct for awe, worship emerges, 
and dignity upon which increasing intelligence makes 
claims is mutilated. To worship thus represents a mis-
understanding of our attraction to wonder, where our 
genetic instinct as pack animals is superimposed on 
our genetic instinct for awe. 
The time has long since emerged to dissolve this en-
tanglement. Our instincts are older than our intelli-
gence and while time has passed, the sophistication of 
our intelligence has grown beyond our instincts and 
the time has come for us to overcome our confusion 
of worship with wonder. Democracy has come a long 
way since its beginning almost 2500 years ago. In some 
respects, it is overwhelmingly close to being complete. 
We need only take the last step and embrace democ-
racy not only in action but also in thought. 
REFERENCES
 
•	 Anderson, G. 2005. “Before Turannoi Were Ty-
rants: Rethinking a Chapter of Early Greek History,” 
Classical Antiquity, Vol. 24, No. 2. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1525/ca.2005.24.2.173
•	 Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. “Modern Moral Phi-
losophy”. Philosophy 33 (124): 1–19. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1017/S0031819100037943
•	 Aronow, V. 1970. United States, 432 F. 2d 242, 243 
(9th Cir. October 6, 1970). 
•	 Austin, M.W. Divine Command Theory. Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
•	 Barrett, David, B. Kurian, George, T. Johnson, 
Todd, M. 2001. World Christian Encyclopedia: A 
Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in 
The Modern World 2. 2nd edition, Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
•	 Becker, C. 1970. The Declaration of Independence: A 
Study in the History of Political Ideas. 1922. Revised 
edition, Vintage Books, New York. 
•	 Beekes, R.S.P. 2009. Etymological Dictionary of 
Greek. Brill.
•	 Bullivant, S. and Michael, R. (eds.). 2013. The Ox-
ford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. 
•	 Burkett, D. 2011. The Blackwell Companion to Je-
sus. John Wiley and Sons. 
•	 Burgess, G. 1992. The Divine Right of Kings 
Reconsidered. The English Historical Review 107 
(425): 837–861. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/
CVII.CCCCXXV.837
•	 Diamond, L. 2003. Can the Whole World Become 
Democratic? Center for the Study of Democracy.
•	 Diamond, L. 2004. What is Democracy? Lecture at 
Hilla University for Humanistic Studies. 
•	 Diderot, D. 1746. Pensées philosophiques. In: Euvres 
Complëtes de Diderot. Hrsg. J. Assézar, ed. [Paris 
1875] Nendeln 1966. Band I. LIX. 
•	 Dunn, J. 1994. Democracy: the unfinished journey 
508 BC – 1993 AD. Oxford University Press. 
•	 Epstein, S.B. 1996. “Rethinking the Constitu-
tionality of Ceremonial Deism”. Columbia Law 
Review 96: 2083-2174.
•	 Fasching, D.J. and deChant, D. 2001. Compara-
tive Religious Ethics: A narrative approach. Black-
well Publishing. 
•	 Favrholdt, D. 1994. Niels Bohr and Realism. In: Jan 
Faye & Henry J. Folse (eds.), Niels Bohr and Con-
temporary Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers: 77-96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-
015-8106-6_4
•	 Franck, T. 1992. “The Emerging Right to Demo-
cratic Governance”. The American Journal of Inter-
national Law 86: 46-91.
•	 Gethin, R. 1998. Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
•	 Hájek, A. 2012. “Pascal ’s Wager”, The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pascal-wager/. 
•	 Harper, D. 2001-2016. Online Etymology Diction-
ary. etymonline.com. 
•	 Herrick, J. 1985. Against the Faith. Glover & Blair, 
London.
•	 Hood, F.C. 1964. The divine politics of Thomas 
Hobbes – an interpretation of Leviathan. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford.
•	 Hornblower, S.S.A. (eds). 1998. Oxford Compan-
ion to Classical Civilization, Oxford. 
•	 Kampourakis, K. 2014. Understanding Evolution. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, NY. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139542357
•	 Keltner, D. and Haidt, J. 2003. Approaching awe, 
a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion. Cog-
nition and Emotion 17: 297–314. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/02699930302297
•	 MacClellan, J.P. 2012. “Minding Nature: A Defense 
of a Sentiocentric Approch to Environmental Ethics”. 
University of Tennessee. 
•	 Martin, M. 1990. Atheism: A Philosophical Justifica-
tion. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
•	 Nielsen, K. 1973. Ethics without God. Prometheus 
Books, Buffalo, N.Y.
Science, Religion & Culture
2016 | Volume 3 | Issue 1 | Page 48                                                      
                              
•	 Oppy, G. 2006. Arguing About Gods. N.Y.: 
Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9780511498978
•	 Oppy, G. 2016. “Ontological Arguments”, The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/on-
tological-arguments/.
•	 Popper, K. 2000. The Lesson of this Century: With 
Two Talks on Freedom and the Democratic State. 
Routledge; 2 edition. 
•	 Qureshi, K. 2009. Afskaf åbningsgudstjenesten. 
Demokratiet skal fejres uden religiøs indblanding. 
Kristeligt Dagblad. 
•	 Rauch, J. 2003. Let It Be: Three Cheers for Apathe-
ism. The Atlantic Monthly, May 2003. 
•	 Robinson, B.A. 2012. “Apatheism: Does God exist? 
I don’t know & I don’t really care”. Religious Toler-
ance.org. 
•	 Rosen, M. 2012. Dignity: Its History and Meaning. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge. http://dx.
doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065512
•	 Rudolph, K. 2000. “Some reflections on approaches 
and methodologies in the study of religions” (231-47). 
In: Secular Theories on Religion: A Selection of Recent 
Academic Perspectives, T. Jensen and M. Rothstein 
eds. The Museum Tusculanum Press, Copenha-
gen.
•	 Salmon, W. 1978. Religion and Science: A New 
Look at Hume’s Dialogues. Philosophical Studies 
33: 143-76. 
•	 Saunders, Chas, Allen, Peter, J. (Editors). 2015. 
Godchecker’s Encyclopedia. www.godchecker.com. 
•	 Silver, L.M. 2006. Challenging Nature. Harper-
Collins Publishers. 
•	 Sirry, M. 2014. Scriptural Polemics: The Qur’an and 
Other Religions. Oxford University Press. 
•	 Stein, G (Editor). 1980. Anthology of Atheism and 
Rationalism. Prometheus Books. 
•	 Swinburne, R.G. 1974. Duty and the Will of 
God. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4(2): 213-
227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1974.1
0716933
•	 The Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5th 
1953; The Act of Succession of March 27th 1953, 
Amended on June 12th 2009, Revised translation 
Birgitte Wern, Published by the Folketing Co-
penhagen 2013. 
•	 Thomasson, A. 2013. “Categories”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/categories/. 
•	 Thompson, S. 2014. Encyclopedia of Diversity and 
Social Justice. Rowman and Littlefield. 
•	 Van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., Kaiser, R. 2008. Lead-
ership, Followership, and Evolution. American 
Psychologist. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-
066X.63.3.182
•	 Von Hegner, I. 2010. Hertugen, Anekdoter fra ven-
skabets rejse. Underskovens forlag. 
•	 Wainwright, W. 2005. Religion and morality. Ash-
gate Publishing. 
•	 Wenar, L. 2015. Rights, The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2015/entries/rights/. 
•	 Woods, C. 2010. “The earliest Mesopotamian writ-
ing”, in Woods, Christopher, Visible language. Inven-
tions of writing in the ancient Middle East and 
beyond Oriental Institute Museum Publications 
32, University of Chicago, Chicago. 
•	 York, M. 2015. Pagan Ethics: Paganism as a World 
Religion, Springer. 
•	 Zagzebski, L.T. 2004. Divine Motivation Theory. 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
